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STOCK REDEMPTIONS AND THE
ESTATE-ATTRIBUTION RULES
INTRODUCTION
When a corporation redeems its stock, the amount received
by the shareholder is treated for tax purposes as either a dividend
or sale.' If a dividend, the amount is included in the shareholder's
income and taxed in full; 2 if a sale, the amount is treated in part
as a tax-free return of the shareholder's basis in the stock,3 and the
remainder may give rise to a capital-gain deduction, reducing the
shareholder's tax on that transaction by 60%. 4  Sections 302 and
318 of the Internal Revenue Code contain complex rules for de-
termining whether the amount is a dividend or sale: section 302
tells a shareholder by how much he must reduce his corporate
ownership in order to treat the redemption as a sale; section 318
helps define that ownership by attributing to the shareholder stock
actually owned by others.
This Comment considers attribution of stock to estates under
section 318 (the "estate-attribution rules"),5 with particular atten-
' See I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 302.
2 See id. § 301 (e)(1).
3 See id. § 301(c)(2).
"Basis" is a technical but important tax concept which is usually equivalent to
the cost of property. See id. § 1012. By paying tax on only the proceeds of a
sale of property in excess of basis, id. §§ 301(c)(3), 1001(a), the taxpayer recoups
his original investment without tax consequences and is taxed only on the gain or
loss. The uninitiated reader who wishes to explore the mysteries of this concept
may do so in the basic text, M. CHMRELSTEn, FEDERAL INcOvE TAXATTON (1977).
One relevant exception to the cost-as-basis rule is inherited property. An
estate's basis in inherited property is "stepped up" to its fair market value at the
time of the decedent's death. I.R.C. § 1014(a). As this Comment goes to press,
the status of stepped-up basis is uncertain. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 substi-
tuted carryover basis for stepped-up basis effective December 31, 1976. Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 2005(a)(2), 90 Stat 1520 (1976) (codified as amended in I.R.C.
§ 1023). Congress then postponed the substitution for three years. Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. 1. No. 95-600, § 515(3), (4), 92 Stat. 2763 (codified in I.R.C.
§ 1023(a)). Currently, both houses have approved repeal of carryover basis in the
form of riders attached to separate "windfall profit" oil-tax bills. 48 U.S.L.W. 2432
(1980).
4 See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(3), 1202.
5 See generally Willens, Recent Decisions Open the Way for Trusts and Estates
to Waive Stock Attribution, 51 J. TAx. 208 (1979). For more general discussion
of §§ 302 and 318, see B. BrrTrx & J. EusrscE, FEDERAL INcom TAXATON OF
COR'ORATIONS AND SHrAnMHOLDERS fffi9.20- .26 (4th ed. 1979); 1 J. M-rxTENs, TnE
LAw OF FEDmiAL INcOME TAXATION § 9.105 (Malone ed. 1974 & Supp. Doheny
,ed. 1979); Cavitch, Problems Arising From the Attribution Rules, 35 N.Y.U. INsT.
FED. TAx. 801 (1977); Loeb, What Constitutes Ownership of Stock, 21 N.Y.U.
INST. FnD. TAx. 417 (1963); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Owner-
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don to the recent case of Rickey v. United States.6  In Rickey, the
Fifth Circuit conceded that under a literal reading of the Code, a
beneficiary's stock must be attributed to an estate under sections
302(c) and 318 (a) (3).7 The court nevertheless held that the Rickey
estate could waive the attribution rules 8 and thereby treat a re-
demption as a sale. The court justified its decision by saying, "the
rationale for applying ... [the] rule is absent, and ... application
of the rule leads to inappropriately harsh results." 9
The underlying issue in Rickey is significant because the
amount of money at stake may be large and the potential for abuse
great. For instance, because the redemption in Rickey qualified as
a sale and the estate's basis in the stock was stepped up to the stock's
fair market value,10 no tax was due. The Internal Revenue Service,
on the other hand, had argued that the redemption was a dividend
and thus taxable as ordinary income." It therefore assessed each
beneficiary a tax deficiency in excess of $24,000.12 Thus, more than
$72,000 in taxes hinged on whether the redemption was taxable as
a dividend or sale.
The Fifth Circuit's holding is problematic. It can be read
as allowing stockholders routinely to include in their wills a pro-
vision directing their estates to offer their shares to the corporation;
the estates and the beneficiaries would then ignore the attribution
rules and treat the redemptions as sales. The results, as in Rickey,
would be substantial reductions in taxes. This result would contra-
vene congressional intent '" and abuse the rationale of the statute.
ship in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAIv. L. REv. 209 (1958). See also
Cathcart, Section 302 Redemptions: Family Fights and Attribution, 61 A.B.A.J.
1272 (1975).




10 See I.R.C. § 1014; note 3 supra.
11592 F.2d at 1253; see I.R.C. § 301(c) (1).
12 The exact amount of the deficiency cannot be calculated from the informa-
tion in the opinions; however, the estimate illustrates that the amounts involved are
substantial. The calculation was made as follows. (All amounts were rounded off
to the nearest dollar.) The amount of ordinary income to the estate was the pro-
ceeds of the redemption, $383,194, less the amount used to pay death taxes,
$228,991, see ER.C. § 303-a total of $154,203. Rickey v. United States, 427 F.
Supp. 484, 486-87 (E.D. La. 1976); see Rickey, 592 F.2d at 1253-54. One-third
of this total, or $51,401, was taxable to each of the three beneficiaries. Id.; see
LIC. § 662. Assuming that each beneficiary was an "individual," see I.R.C. § 1(a)
(1965), and that $51,401 was his total taxable income, the tax could be calculated
from the tax tables in effect for the appropriate year, 1968. The tax was $23,940
plus 66% of the amount in excess of $50,000. Id. Therefore, each beneficiary's tax
was $24,865.
'1 See text accompanying notes 76-88 infra.
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To lay the foundation for a better understanding of estate at-
tribution, this Comment will first describe the statutory scheme for
taxation of stock redemptions. It will then consider the theory and
policy of the attribution rules, with an analysis of the legislative
history and case law concerning the attribution rules and stock
redemptions. After describing the facts of Rickey and criticizing
the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Comment will apply the theory
and policy of the attribution rules to Rickey and propose a new
analysis to be used when an estate's stock is redeemed by the cor-
poration.
I. Ti STATUTORY SCHEME 
4
The critical question when a corporation redeems its stock
from a shareholder is whether (for tax purposes) the redemption is a
sale of stock or a dividend.-5 Under section 302(b), a shareholder
must reduce his ownership interest for the redemption to be treated
as a sale and thereby gain favorable tax treatment. 16 It is possible
for a shareholder to "sell" several of his shares back to the corpora-
tion without having his claim to the assets of the corporation or
voting rights reduced; 17 for example, if the owner of all of the
shares of a corporation sells some of them back to the corporation,
he is, in reality, merely withdrawing accumulated earnings. He
has not suffered the reduction in ownership interest that normally
accompanies a sale: he still owns all of the outstanding stock and
has not reduced his proportionate claim to the assets of the cor-
poration or his voting rights. He is thus properly taxed as if he
had received a dividend. Taxation of a redemption as a sale or
dividend therefore depends on the shareholder's ownership interest
in the stock both before and after the redemption. "The hallmarks
of a dividend ... are pro rata distribution of earnings and profits
and no change in basic shareholder relationships." 18
The shareholder's ownership of stock is partially determined
by the constructive-ownership rules of section 318, which attribute
-4 The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that are directly relevant to
Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979), are §§ 301, 302, and 318.
15 The question is important because dividends, which are distributions of
earnings and profits, are taxed at ordinary rates while sales of capital assets such as
stock are taxed at favorable capital-gain rates. See notes 1-4 supra & accompanying
text.
16 See text accompanying notes 26-53 infra.
17 The Second Circuit has defined three shareholder interests: the rights "(1)
to vote, and thereby exercise control, (2) to participate in current earnings and
accumulated surplus, and (3) to share in net assets on liquidation." Himmel v.
Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
Is Id. See also Cathcart, supra note 5; Postlewaite & Finneran, Section 302
(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow, 64 VA. L. BIrv. 561 (1978).
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one taxpayer's stock ownership to another. These attribution
rules prevent a shareholder from treating a. redemption as a sale
when certain relatives or entities maintain a sufficient interest such
that his own ownership interest effectively continues. 19
A. The Constructive-Ownership Rules 20
To prevent tax avoidance, ownership of stock by one person
or entity may be attributed to a second person or entity. The
family-attribution rules provide that an individual is deemed to
own stock owned by his spouse, children, grandchildren, and par-
ents.21 The estate-beneficiary attribution rules provide that an
estate is deemed to own stock that is actually or constructively
owned by its beneficiaries, 22 and that a beneficiary is deemed to
own stock owned by an estate in an amount equal to his propor-
tionate interest in the entire estate.23  Double attribution is not
allowed in certain circumstances; 24 in particular, stock held con-
structively by an estate through one beneficiary may not be reat-
tributed to a second beneficiary.
25
These rules may be illustrated as follows: Suppose father and
son each own 50% of a corporation. If the father dies and his wife
is sole beneficiary, she will be deemed to own 100% of the stock
of the corporation: she will constructively own the son's 50%
through the family-attribution rules and constructively own the
shares held by the estate through the estate-to-beneficiary rule.
The estate will likewise be deemed to own 100% of the corporation:
19 The rationales for the attribution rules-guidance for taxpayers and preven-
tion of tax avoidance-will be discussed in part I, text accompanying notes 54-88
infra.
20 I.R.C. §318(a). Other constructive-ownership rules, not relevant to this
Comment, are embodied in § 267, 544, and 671. See generally Binge], Surrey, &
Warren, supra note 5.
21 "An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for-(i) his spouse... and (ii) his children, grandchildren, and
parents." I.R.C. § 318(a) (1) (A). Note that stock is not attributed among siblings.
2 2 "Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for.., a beneficiary of an estate
shall be considered as owned by the... estate." Id. § 318(a) (3) (A).
23 "Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a[n] . . . estate shall be
considered as owned proportionately by its . . . beneficiaries." Id. § 318(a) (2) (A).
Other rules attribute stock of and to trusts, id. 9318(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B),
and corporations, id. §318(a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(C), and attribute stock options, id.
§318(a)(4), (a)(5)(D).
24d. § 318(a) (5) (A)-(C).
25 "Stock constructively owned by... [an] estate . . . by reason of the appli-
cation of paragraph (3) [(beneficiary-to-estate attribution, see note 22 supra)]
shall not be considered as owned by it for purposes of applying paragraph (2)
[(estate-to-beneficiary attribution, see note 23 supra)] in order to make another the
constructive owner of such stock." I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C).
1980]
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the 50% that it actually owns and the 50% that is attributed from
son to wife through family attribution, and then reattributed from
wife to the estate through beneficiary-to-estate attribution.
B. The Stock-Redemption Rules
The rules relating to stock redemptions 26 are complex. If a
corporation redeems its stock and the shareholder meets certain
specific ownership criteria,27 the redemption is treated as a sale of
the stock and the transaction taxed at capital-gain rates.28  If these
criteria are not met, the transaction is treated as a dividend and
taxed at ordinary rates.29  In determining whether these ownership
criteria are met, the constructive-ownership rules apply.30
1. The Complete-Termination Test
Section 302(b) (3) is a safe-harbor provision-a mechanical rule
guaranteeing favorable treatment for the complying taxpayer. It
is the simplest of the corporate redemption provisions to under-
stand and apply. It is also the most difficult requirement to meet: 31
a shareholder must dispose of his entire interest in the corpora-
tion.3 2 If he does, he may treat the redemption as a sale of the
stock and gain favorable tax treatment. Because the attribution
26I.R.C. § 302.
27 These criteria are specified in id. §302(b)(1)-(3). Section 302(b)(4),
relating to redemption of stock of bankrupt railroads, is special-interest legislation
not relevant to this Comment.
28"If a corporation redeems its stock . . . and if [§302(b)(1)-(3)] . . .
applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment
in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 302(a). See generally text accompanying
notes 1-4 supra.
29 See I.R.C. § §301(c)(1), 302, 316(a).
30"Except as provided in [§ 302(c) (2) (waiver of family attribution for pur-
poses of the complete-termination test)] .... section 318(a) shall apply in deter-
mining the ownership of stock for purposes of this section." Id. § 302(c) (1).
3lEach of the three relevant provisions of I.R.C. §302(b) calls for the tax-
payer to reduce his interest in the corporation to some extent. Section 302(b)(1)
has been interpreted as calling for a "meaningful reduction" of interest. United
States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970). Section 302(b)(2) requires a distri-
bution to be "substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder." Section
302(b) (3) requires the shareholder to dispose of all of his shares in the corporation.
At first glance it appears that §302(b)(3) is unnecessary because a complete
termination of interest will always be substantially disproportionate. Section 302
(c) (2), however, provides for nonapplication of the family-attribution rules if a
shareholder terminates his actual ownership interest. See note 36 infra & accom-
panying text. This provision is not available when the taxpayer relies on § 302(b)
(2). The concept of reduction in ownership interests will be discussed further in
part H infra.
8 2 "[Section 302(a) will apply] if the redemption is in complete redemption of
all of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder." I.R.C. § 302(b) (3).
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rules apply, however, the redemption will not be a complete
termination of interest and will be taxed as a dividend at the
ordinary tax rates if certain relatives, 3 an estate of which the share-
holder is a beneficiary, or any other section 318(a) entity 3- holds
stock in the corporation. Section 302(c)(2) allows a shareholder
who has had all of his shares redeemed by the corporation to "waive"
the family-attribution rules if he agrees to forego any interest in
the corporation, except as a creditor, for ten years.30 Upon filing
the waiver agreement, the shareholder can have the redemption
treated as a sale of his interest (provided no other attribution rule
S3Id. 318(a)(1); see note 21 supra.
84 1.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A); see note 23 supra.
35 See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
86 The section reads, in relevant part:
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b)(3),
section 318(a)(1) shall not apply if-
(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no in-
terest in the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or
employee), other than an interest as a creditor,
(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest (other than
stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the
date of such distribution, and
(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as the
Secretary by regulations prescribes, files an agreement to notify the
Secretary of any acquisition described in clause (ii) and to retain such
records as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
(B) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall not apply if-
(i) any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired, directly or
indirectly, within the 10-year period ending on the date of the distri-
bution by the distributee from a person the ownership of whose stock
would (at the time of distribution) be attributable to the distributee
under section 318(a), or
(ii) any person owns (at the time of the distribution) stock the
ownership of which is attributable to the distributee under section
318(a) and such person acquired any stock in the corporation, directly
or indirectly, from the distributee within the 10-year period ending on
the date of the distribution, unless such stock so acquired from the
distributee is redeemed in the same transaction.
The preceding sentence shall not apply if the acquisition (or, in the case
of clause (ii), the disposition) by the distributee did not have as one of
its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.
I.R.C. § 302(c) (2).
Note that § 302(c) provides for waiver only by the "distributee" (the person
who sells the shares to the corporation) and allows waiver only of family attribution.
Id. § 302(c)(1).
In Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830 (1973), the court considered
whether a beneficiary could waive family attribution when the estate was the owner
of the shares being redeemed. The court did not rule on the effectiveness of this
waiver; however, it did allow the estate to waive the family-attribution rules. The
Commissioner has announced nonacquiescence in this decision. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
For a complete discussion of the mechanics of waiver, see Cavitch, supra note
5, at 822-31.
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is applicable). This is the only provision for waiver of attribution
rules.3r
2. The Substantially-Disproportionate Test 38
Like the complete-termination test, the substantially-dispro-
portionate test of section 302(b) (2) delimits a safe harbor. It has
two major components. Under the first, after the redemption
the taxpayer must own less than 50%/ of the total "voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote." 39 Under the second, the share-
holder must reduce his proportionate ownership of the voting stock
of the corporation by more than 20%.40 As before,41 the attribution
rules are applied to determine ownership. If the taxpayer meets
these mathematical tests, he is entitled to treat the redemption as a
sale and be taxed at capital-gain rates.
4 2
This provision may be illustrated as follows: Suppose a share-
holder owns sixty of the one hundred outstanding shares of the
corporation. If he redeems thirteen shares, he will not qualify for
capital-gain treatment because after the redemption he will own
more than 50% of the stock outstanding.4 3  If he redeems twenty-
3 7 I.R.C. § 302(c) (1); see note 30 supra.
88I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). A detailed analysis of this section is beyond the scope
of this Comment
89Id. § 302(b)(2)(B). This is the "50% test."
40 The section reads in part:
For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is substantially dispropor-
tionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of the
voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all of
the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
Id. §302(b)(2)(C). This is the "20% test" This is sometimes referred to as the
"80% test." E.g., J. MEnT s, supra note 5, § 9.105 at ch. 9, 34547.
The redeeming stockholder's proportionate ownership of all common stock
(whether voting or nonvoting) must also be reduced by over 20%:
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as sub-
stantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the com-
mon stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after and
before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement of the preceding
sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if there is more than
one class of common stock, the determinations shall be made by reference
to fair market value.
id.
41 See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
42 LIC § 302(a).
48 After redeeming 13 shares, the shareholder owns 47 of the 87 outstanding
shares, or 54%. This redemption also fails the 20% test; the stockholder has reduced
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four shares, the redemption is substantially disproportionate be-
cause he will then own less than 50% of the stock outstanding,"
and his proportionate interest in the corporation will be reduced
by more than 20%, from 60% to 47%. Thus, the redemption of
twenty-four shares is treated as a sale.
3. The Not-Equivalent-to-a-Dividend Test
Section 302(b)(1) provides for capital-gain treatment if the
redemption is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." 45 This
is a vague test in which the facts and circumstances of each case
are paramount; 41 it has been the subject of much litigation.
47
Reliance is placed on this provision only if the taxpayer fails to
meet the safe-harbor provisions of either the complete-termination
or substantially-disproportionate test.
48
The leading case interpreting section 302 (b)(1) is United
States v. Davis.49 In Davis, the taxpayer owned 100% of the pre-
ferred stock and 25% of the common stock of a corporation, and
his wife and two children each owned 25% of the common. The
corporation redeemed all of the preferred from the taxpayer, who
argued that the attribution rules do not apply to section 302(b)(1),
so that he should have been "considered to own only 25 percent of
the corporation's common stock, and the distribution would then
qualify under § 302(b)(1) since it was not pro rata or proportionate
to his stock interest, the fundamental test of dividend equival-
ency." 50
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the
attribution rules do apply to section 302(b)(1) .51 The Court stated
that the proper test to be used under this section is whether the
redemption results in a "meaningful reduction of the shareholder's
his proportionate interest by only 10%. (This and all percentages in this Comment
are rounded to the nearest 1.)
44 After the redemption of 24 shares, the shareholder owns 36 of the 76 out-
standing shares, or 47%.
45 I.R.C. § 302.(b)(1).
4
6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
47See, e.g., Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975); Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. United States, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973); Commissioner v.
Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966).
48 See B. Brrrx-m & J. Eusrrc, supra note 5, 79.20, at 9-11 (4th ed. 1979)
("[T]his is a treacherous route to be employed only as a last resort.").
49397 U.S. 301 (1970).
5o d. 306.
51 Id. 307.
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proportionate interest in the corporation." 52 Thus, the reduction
of ownership in Davis was not meaningful because the taxpayer
owned 100% of the outstanding stock at all times: after the redemp-
tion he actually owned 25% and constructively owned 75%. The
Supreme Court's decision in Davis, however, has not ended section
302(b)(1) litigation; rather, it has shifted the focus of litigation to
the question of what is a meaningful reduction of interest.53
To understand how this statutory scheme works, it is necessary
to examine the underlying theory and congressional purpose in
enacting the provision.
II. THEORY OF ATTRIBUTION AND ITS RELATION TO REDEMPTIONS
A. Basic Principles
As has been shown, the first question to ask when a corporation
redeems its stock is whether the redemption is a sale or a dividend.
54
Section 302(b) contains three tests, based on the change in the tax-
payer's ownership interest, for determining if a sale has occurred. 55
The constructive-ownership rules of section 318 51 are thus critical
because of their effect on what is deemed to be part of that owner-
ship interest. They were enacted by Congress to prevent tax avoid-
ance 57 and to allow tax planning by establishing precise standards
so that a taxpayer can determine when he will be deemed to own
stock actually owned by another.55
The family-attribution rules 59 are based upon the presumption
that there is familial unity of control and interest.60 Thus, one
spouse is presumed to have a significant degree of control over stock
52 Id. 313. The Court also held that the existence of a legitimate business
purpose was irrelevant to the question of dividend equivalency under § 302(b) (1).
Id. 312.
53 See, e.g., Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979); Wright
v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111.
Cf. Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (family hostility is
factor to be considered in mitigation of constructive-ownership rules under § 302
(b) (1)). For a discussion of what interests are considered in making this deter-
mination, see Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally
Note, I.R.C. f 302(b)(1): Dividend Equivalency After United States v. Davis, 7 FLA.
ST. L. RFv. 505 (1979).
54 See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
55 See text accompanying notes 26-53 supra.
56 See generally text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
57 See text accompanying note 82 infra. See generally, e.g., Ringel, Surrey &
Warren, supra note 5; 55 B.U. L. REv. 667 (1975).
58 See text accompanying notes 76-88 infra.
59 I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (A); see note 21 supra.
60 See B. BIrrxER & J. EusncE, supra note 5, IT 9.23, at 9-26.
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owned by the other spouse, and a parent is presumed to have inter-
ests in common with his child.61 The attribution rules presume
that when an individual's stock is redeemed by a corporation in
which certain relatives also own stock, his ownership interest effec-
tively continues.
62
In some cases, however, this presumption may be invalid. Per-
sonal relationships are fragile, and "bad blood" may exist among
relatives. Thus an individual may not be able to control stock
owned by a relative. If family hostility is proven, courts have in
fact found that the redemption is "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend" under section 302(b)(1) and, thus, have treated it as a
sale of the stock.63  Courts have been flexible because section
302(b)(1) is not rigid,64 as are the other provisions of section 302(b).
Congress recognized the fragile nature of personal relationships and
provided, in section 302(c)(2), for the waiver of the family-attribu-
tion rules when the shareholder terminates his actual ownership.
65
The entity-attribution rules,66 on the other hand, are based
on an identity of economic interests. 67 A beneficiary will aid the
estate because he ultimately will receive assets of the estate. Al-
though he may dislike the executor, he will not normally sever
his connection to the estate for this reason. Indeed, because an
executor is in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries,6 8 he
must always work for their economic benefit, even if not always in
accordance with their wishes.
This attribution rule, however, has also been circumscribed
when it failed to reflect the economic interests accurately. The
court in Estate of Arthur H. Squier,69 for example, held that
demonstrated hostility between executor and beneficiaries was suf-
61 See Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979).
62 See B. Brrrmm & J. EUsTicE, supra note 5, at 1f 9.23, at 9-26.
63 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116 n.7 (1st Cir. 1962);
Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961); Herbert C. Parker, 20 T.C.M. 893
(1961). This principle has vitality even after United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301
(1970). See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975); Comment,
Defining Dividend Equivalency Under Section 302(b)(1), 16 V.L. L. REv. 88, 105
(1970). But see Comment, Income Tax: Stock Redemption and the Test for Divi-
dend Equivalency Under Section 302(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
23 U. FLA. L. REv. 188, 192 n.38 (1970). See generally Cathcart, note 5 supra.
It should be noted that, although the hostility in Squier was between executor
and beneficiaries, that case is cited as involving family hostility. See note 108 infra.
64 See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
65 I.R.C. § 302(c) (2); see text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
66 .R.C. § 318(a)(2), (3). See notes 22-23 supra & accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., B. Brrrxn' & J. EusTIcE, supra note 5, 1f 9.23, at 9-26.
68 RESTATEIENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
6035 T.C. 950 (1961).
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ficient reason to declare the redemption of the estate's stock "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" despite the attribution rules.
Because of the hostility, the estate actually lost control of the
corporation.
B. Tax Avoidance and Estate Attribution
Estate attribution works in two directions to prevent two
methods of tax avoidance. The first is from beneficiary to estate: 70
when an estate's stock is redeemed, consideration is given to the
beneficiary's stock holdings. This attribution is necessary to pre-
vent an estate from making transactions at capital-gain rates when
the same transaction, if carried out by the beneficiary, would be
taxed at ordinary rates. 71 If estate and beneficiary were always
taxed at the same rate, whether capital-gain (sale) or ordinary
(dividend),72 there would be no tax-avoidance motivation; the
attribution rules force this result. Because estates are usually short-
lived, however, their stock may properly be viewed as effectively
owned by the beneficiaries.73
The second direction of attribution is from estate to bene-
ficiary.74 This type prevents a beneficiary from having his shares
redeemed and then paying capital-gain taxes without considering
shares held by the estate on his behalf. Again because estates are
short-lived, the beneficiary, without attribution, could have his
shares redeemed without effectively suffering a loss of his owner-
ship, and yet be taxed as if he had sold his interest in the corporation.
The attribution rules prevent this.
7
70 I.R.C. § 318(a)(3) (A); see note 22 supra.
71 See Ringel, Surrey, & Warren, supra note 5, at 262.
72 Congress has sought to prevent tax avoidance by estates and beneficiaries
in different tax brackets. Generally, the income of an estate will be taxed at the
beneficiary's tax rate. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 661, 662.
73 When there are several beneficiaries, each may stand in a different tax pos-
ture and a redemption may be taxed differently for each. Thus, when the estate's
stock is redeemed, some beneficiaries may have a tax-avoidance motive, while others
may not. An extreme example occurs when one beneficiary owns all stock not
owned by the estate, while the other beneficiaries own no stock. This is analogous
to the situation in Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979), and
will be discussed in text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
74 .R.C. § 318(a) (2)(A); see note 23 supra.
7 5 Under §318(a)(2)(A), a beneficiary is deemed to own the estate's stock
in an amount proportional to his share of the entire estate, even if he does not
inherit the estate's stock or the proceeds of its distribution. In this situation, if the
beneficiary sells his own shares, he necessarily suffers a reduction in his interest in
the corporation. Thus, here the rationale for estate-to-beneficiary attribution is




This rule may be illustrated as follows: Suppose a sole bene-
ficiary owns a 33%/ interest in the corporation and the estate also
owns 33%o. The beneficiary is thus deemed to own 66%/ of the
corporation; if he has all of his stock redeemed, he will construc-
tively hold 50%/ of the outstanding stock after the redemption.
Estate-to-beneficiary attribution causes the beneficiary to be taxed
as if he owned the estate's stock.
C. Congressional Intent "
Under the 1939 Code the sole test for determining the tax
treatment of stock redemptions was the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend
test.7 7  The House committee redrafting the Code in 1954 said
about this vague test:
Under present law it is not clear when a stock re-
demption results in capital gain or ordinary income....
In general, because of the considerable confusion which
exists in this area, taxpayers have been faced with potential
dividend-tax liability in many cases where such ,result is
unwarranted, and in other cases have avoided such lia-
bility where the redemption was the equivalent of a
dividend.
78
The 1954 House proposal was designed to provide "definite
conditions under which stock may be redeemed at capital-gain
rates." 79 Instead of providing for an ad hoc inquiry in every case,
the House bill set forth specific guidelines so that a taxpayer could
ascertain in advance whether a redemption would be taxed as a
dividend or sale. These provisions are the current sections 302
(b)(2) and 302(b) (3). The Senate found these rules "unnecessarily
restrictive, particularly in the case of redemptions of preferred stock
which might be called by the corporation without the shareholder
76 As has been demonstrated, two of the tests of § 302 are rigid and mechanical
safe harbors, while the third grants some flexibility to the courts. See text accom-
panying notes 31-53 supra. Although the Code seems clear with respect to the
rigid tests, the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test is ambiguous, so a court would be
justified in examining the legislative history to see how the more flexible rule relates
to the others. Thus, although it is true that, "[wihen a statute is unambiguous,
the courts may not look elsewhere for the legislative intent," Easson v. Commis-
sioner, 294 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1961), the structure of section 302(b) suggests
that a court's examination of the legislative history is appropriate, but only with
respect to subsection (b)(1).
77 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (now I.R.C. § 302(b)
(1)).
78 H.R. RP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 4017, 4060 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
79 Id. at 35, [1954] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 4061.
1980]
662 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
having any control over when the redemption may take place." 80
The Senate then reinserted the "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend" language in what became the current section 302(b)(1). 81
In so doing, the Senate maintained some flexibility in the law.
Congress enacted the attribution rules to prevent tax avoidance
and to permit tax planning. The House Report said that
[t]o prevent tax avoidance, but at the same time to provide
definitive rules for the guidance of taxpayers, your com-
mittee has provided precise standards whereby under
specific circumstances, a shareholder may be considered as
owning stock held by members of his immediate family
(or by partnerships, corporations, or trusts which he con-
trois).82
Both houses of Congress intended the substantially-disproportionate
test of section 302(b)(2) to apply on a shareholder-by-shareholder
basis.83 Thus, the same redemption could be a dividend for one
shareholder and a sale for another.
The Senate explicitly stated that the complete-termination test
must be read in conjunction with the constructive-ownership rules.
8 4
The Senate committee discussed the waiver provisions of section
302(c)(2) and provided for their application only in the context of
family attribution; no mention was made of waiver of entity attribu-
tion. 5 The Senate also amended the House's attribution rules re-
lating to estates; the House bill provided for attribution between
an estate and a beneficiary only if the beneficiary had an interest
of at least 50% in the estate, while the Senate version is the current
law.
The legislative history indicates that the complete-termination
and substantially-disproportionate tests, unlike the not-equivalent-
to-a-dividend test, are specific, mechanical rules. Furthermore, the
Reports show that attribution should apply to the complete-
termination test, and specifically to the estate and beneficiary.8 6
80 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4675 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
81 Id. at 44, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 4675.
82 H. REP., supra note 78, at 36, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4061.
83 S. REP., supra note 80, at 234, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4871;
H. REP., supra note 78, at A74, [1954] U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws at 4211.
84 S. REP., supra note 80, at 235, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4872.
85 Id. at 235-36, [1954] U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NhEws at 4872-73.
86 These conclusions are central to a critique of the decision in Rickey v.




Section 302 is thus a complex provision designed to add cer-
tainty to the tax laws and provide definite guidance to taxpayers.
The safe-harbor provisions of sections 302(b)(2) and 302(b)(3) pro-
vide taxpayers with mechanical tests; section 302(b)(1) provides
for relief when the mechanical tests are not met but the redemption
should still not be taxed as a dividend. Only in the last test is
there an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case,1
7
with the key question whether the redemption has resulted in a
meaningful reduction of the shareholder's interest. Especially
because Congress has provided different tests for different situations,
courts should be reluctant to deviate from this deliberate statutory
scheme. As the Third Circuit has said about the tax statute in
general:
Efforts are made continuously, on the one side, to close the
gaps through which taxpayers have escaped untaxed, and,
on the other to provide relief for the taxpayer in a hard-
ship position. Corrective legislation with respect to the
taxing statute has been the continuous duty of the legisla-
tive branch. Certain areas of the Code have been phrased
in broad terms which sometimes prove provocative of
judicial legislation. However, detailed sections of the
Code have left little room for the engraftment of judicial
addenda to the end of making a "better" statute. A more
literal interpretation of the statute consistent with the
established meaning of the previously used legislative
wording is the only method compatible with such de-
tail.88
III. THE PROBLEM OF Rickey
The recent case of Rickey v. United States 89 highlights the
problems that can occur when a court both strays from a strict
application of section 302 and misperceives the theory of attribu-
tion and congressional intent.
A. Estate's Position Under Section 302
In Rickey, Horace B. Rickey, Sr. ("Rickey") was president and
principal shareholder of Horace B. Rickey, Inc. When Rickey died,
the corporation, under a mandatory provision of its bylaws,g0 re-
87 See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955). Business purposes are irrelevant to
this determination. See notes 49-52 supra & accompanying text.
88 St. Louis Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1956).
89 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
90 The provision literally called only for an option to repurchase the shares, but
the shareholders viewed the provision as mandatory. The corporation maintained
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deemed his stock from his estate. Three of the estate's beneficiaries
-Horace B. Rickey, Jr. ("Junior"), who was also a corporate officer,
and two of Rickey's minor children-owned shares of the corpora-
tion. The distribution of actual ownership before and after re-









Shares % Shares %
1292 57% - -
708 31% 708 74%
n 80 4% 80 8%
175 8% 175 18%
2255 100% 963 100%
Under the literal terms of the Code, the estate was in a poor
tax position. Because of section 302(c)(1), 92 the stock of the bene-


















The redemption of stock did not seem to qualify for favorable tax
treatment as a sale under any part of section 302. There was no
complete termination of interest under section 302(b)(3)94 be-
insurance on the lives of key shareholders for the purpose of having enough cash
to exercise the options. The purpose of the insurance/repurchase arrangement was
to maintain control of the corporation "in the hands of those who were active in
the business." Id. 1253.
91 This table is a simplified version of those appearing in 592 F.2d at 1253.
92 See note 30 supra.
93 See 592 F.2d at 1258 n.7. (The estate's exact post-redemption interest was
81.8276%.)
94 See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
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cause, even though the estate had sold all its stock, it still owned
82% through attribution. Likewise, attribution prevented the
estate from meeting the substantially-disproportionate test of section
302(b)(2) 95-the estate failed both the 50% and 20% tests. 8
Finally, the redemption was "not essentially equivalent to a div-
idend" under section 302(b)(1) 97 because the estate did not achieve
a "meaningful reduction" of interest in the corporation; 1s the
82% attributed ownership sufficed to control all of the corporation's
activities. The IRS therefore taxed the redemption as a dividend.
Because the estate's only hope for favorable tax treatment was
to dispense somehow with the attribution rules, it filed a statement
purporting to waive beneficiary-to-estate attribution,99 paid the
income tax as assessed, and commenced a refund suit.100
B. The Fifth Circuit's Decision
Both waiver and suit succeeded. Despite the apparent lack of
a statutory foundation, the Fifth Circuit held that an estate may
waive the beneficiary-to-estate attribution of section 318(a) (3) in
order to qualify for a complete termination of interest under sec-
tion 302(b)(3).' 01 The court recognized that this result was in-
appropriate under a literal reading of the Code, 02 but rejected such
a reading "when the rationale for applying a rule is absent, and
95 See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
90 See note 40 supra & text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
97 See text accompanying notes 45-53 supra.
9 8 See text accompanying note 52 supra. Contra Rickey, 592 F.2d at 1258 n.7.
For a discussion of this aspect of Rickey and why it was incorrect, see note 113
infra.
99 The Code does not provide for such waiver. 592 F.2d at 1257; see note 30
supra. The estate was analogizing its claim to the waiver of family attribution, see
note 36 supra & accompanying text, permitted by § 302(c) (2). See 592 F.2d at
1257.
100 The sequence of events actually was more complicated, though not sig-
nificantly different. The beneficiaries initially treated the redemption as a sale and
reported no income. The IRS next audited the estate and beneficiaries, treated the
transaction as a dividend, and assessed a deficiency. The estate was then reopened
in order to file a waiver. Finally, the beneficiaries paid the assessment, filed for
refunds, and, when denied, filed suit. 592 F.2d at 1253-54.
The estate was not reopened until 1973 because the IRS had previously refused
to allow an entity to waive any attribution rules. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2
C.B. 106. In 1973, the Tax Court, in Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830
(1973), became the first court to hold that an estate could waive family attribution.
101 592 F.2d at 1258.
102 "(U]nder a literal reading of the Code, the Rickey estate, regardless of the
relationships amongst the estate and the heirs, could not effectively waive the entity
attribution rules of 318(a) (3)." Id. 1257.
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where application of the rule leads to inappropriately harsh re-
sults." 103
The rationale was lacking, in the court's view, because "de-
cedent's death was [not] a device to bleed out corporate profits at
capital gain rates." 104 The "harsh" result, which apparently was
the taxation at ordinary rates, was "inappropriate" because the
estate "merely carr[ied] out the provisions of decedent's will" with-
out "motivation... of benefitting the beneficiaries." 105 Thus the
court fashioned a rule allowing waiver of beneficiary-to-estate at-
tribution whenever an estate, motivated by mandatory provisions of
a will, completely terminates its corporate interest.10
This new waiver rule is incorrect: it lacks direct precedential
support and misperceives the purpose and theory of the redemption
and waiver rules. For example, three cases relied upon by the
Rickey court for allowing waiver despite the plain language of the
Code 107 are inapposite. Two involved family discord'108 and were
decided under the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test of section 302
(b) (1),109 a section purposely retained from prior law in order to
provide a flexible test of redemptions.110 In Rickey, however, there
was evidence neither of family nor other discord, nor any other
positive reason to ignore a presumption of economic identity be-
tween actual and constructive owners."' The third case allowed
108 Id. 1258.
104 Id.
105 Id. The court did not mention another harsh result: the minor children's
portion of the estate would be deprived of capital-gain treatment only because of
Junior's holdings in the corporation. This inequity, and a proposed solution, are
discussed in text accompanying notes 119-66 infra.
106 This represents a very narrow view of what the Rickey court held. Because
of the vagueness of the opinion, however, it would be easy for a court to interpret
the opinion more broadly by, for example, not requiring that the will provision be
mandatory. To the extent that the rule is interpreted more expansively than it is
here, it is even more subject to the criticisms of this section.
107 Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975); Crawford v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830 (1973); Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950
(1961).
108 Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975); Estate of Arthur
H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961). In Squier, the discord was actually between
executor and beneficiaries, but the Rickey court and others have read the decision
as one of family discord. See, e.g., Rickey, 592 F.2d at 1257; Haft Trust, 510 F.2d
at 46-47.
109 See text accompanying notes 45-53 supra.
110 See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
111 See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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an estate to waive family attribution and therefore does not directly
support waiver of entity attribution.112
The Rickey court's use of the flexible approach of section 302
(b)(1) in the context of section 302 (b) (3) ignores the purposeful
separation of the two provisions.1 3 Impatiently calling the attribu-
tion and safe-harbor rules "horror stories" 114 comparable to "King
Minos's labyrinth in ancient Criete," 115 the court flouted the purpose
of providing definite guidance to taxpayers through precise stand-
ards. The court's opinion allows a person to put a provision in his
will directing his estate to offer all of his stock to the corporation so
that the transaction will be treated as a sale and taxed at capital-
gain rather than ordinary-income rates, even if the sole beneficiary
owns the balance of the outstanding stock.
Although the court was unhappy that all beneficiaries were
taxed at ordinary rates though the deceased's death was not a tax-
avoidance scheme to "bleed out corporate profits at capital gains
rates," 116 it is not unusual for the method of disposing of property
alone to determine the tax treatment of the disposal. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has noted, in another context: "Congress having de-
termined that different tax consequences shall flow from different
methods by which the shareholders of a closely held corporation
may dispose of corporate property, we accept its mandate." "I
Section 302 cannot, therefore, be called a "trap forthe unwary,"
as it was by the district court in Rickey." 8
12 Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830 (1973). This distinction was recog-
nized in Rickey. 592 F.2d at 1257-58.
.13 See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
The Rickey court also offered a possible alternative holding based on § 302
(b) (1). 592 F.2d at 1258 n.7. It reasoned that there was a meaningful reduction
because the estate completely terminated its actual ownership. This dictum-that
attribution is ignored whenever an estate completely redeems its actual ownership-
is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301
(1970) (see text accompanying note 51 supra), as well as contrary to the letter of
§302(c)(1), see note 30 supra, and Congress's intent. When an estate redeems
all its stock, it of course sustains a meaningful reduction in ownership. This, how-
ever, does not mean that the beneficiaries suffer a loss of control or ownership.
The attribution rules were designed to apply in this type of situation, in which one
taxpayer (the beneficiary) uses another related taxpayer (the estate) to "sell" stock
at capital-gain rates, while suffering no corresponding reduction of interest.
114 592 F.2d at 1255.
115 Id. 1256 n.5.
116 Id. 1258.
117 United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 456 (1950).
Compare Cumberland with Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945). The transactions in these two cases yielded identical economic results but
were taxed differently because the methods of achieving those economic results were
different
l 8 Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484, 489 (W.D. La. 1976).
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C. Rickey and Attribution Policy
The estate-attribution rules are consistent with their under-
lying theory if an estate has only one beneficiary; however, when
there are several beneficiaries, inequities may arise. Although each
beneficiary may be in a different tax posture, each is taxed in the
same manner as the others when the estate's stock is redeemed.
This was the situation in Rickey. Although the estate was not
entitled to capital-gain treatment,119 the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
allowed the estate to waive attribution and receive capital-gain
treatment because of the "harsh result" that would follow a literal
reading of the statute.1 20  The purportedly harsh result-that an
estate receives a dividend when it terminates its interest in a cor-
poration controlled by the beneficiaries-was indeed intended by
Congress 12 1 and flows logically from the realistic presumption of
identical economic interests.
122
A closer analysis of Rickey, however, reveals an inequity that
the court failed to mention. If the stock had been distributed to
the beneficiaries and then redeemed, the minor children would have
been entitled to capital-gain treatment under the substantially-dis-
proportionate test of section 302(b) (2). Each beneficiary construc-
tively owned one-third of the estate, so if the stock had been dis-
tributed and then sold, their ownership would have been as
follows: 128
OWNERSHIP AFTER DISTRIBUTION TO BENEFICIARIES
Before After
Redemption Redemption
Shares % Shares %
Junior 1139 50% 708 74%
Minor Children 941 42% 80 8%
Others 175 8% 175 18%
Total 2255 100% 963 100%
Junior's ownership in the corporation would actually have increased
as a result of the redemption; therefore, he could not have qualified
119 See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
120 See text accompanying notes 101-12 supra.
121 See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
122 See text accompanying notes 56-75 supra.
123 Each beneficiary was a "residuary universal legatee." 592 F.2d at 1253.
In the actual facts, each received one-third of the proceeds of the redemption.
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for capital-gain treatment under the test of section 302.124 The
minor children, on the other hand, both would have achieved a
substantially-disproportionate reduction in ownership under section
302(b)(2) 125 and would thus have been taxed at capital-gain rates.
Only Junior, therefore, could have avoided tax by having the estate
waive attribution and redeem the shares.
Because the Rickey estate, under a proper reading of the statute,
should have paid taxes at ordinary rates, the beneficiary-to-estate
attribution rules ' 26 forced only the minor children to pay greater
taxes than they otherwise would have. This result is ironic because
the attribution rules are structured to prevent avoidance by another
taxpayer, Junior, with whom the minor children lack a close familial
tie and unity of economic interests under those rules.
2 7
In this situation-in which some beneficiaries may legitimately
realize a sale if the stock is redeemed after distribution-tax treat-
ment depends only on the timing of the transaction. This result,
compelling ordinary-income treatment because of poor timing and
another's tax-avoidance motives, is inequitable and not required
by the rationale of the attribution rules. A more precise analysis
of beneficiaries' economic interests would remedy this unfairness.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE
A. The Analysis
As shown above, not all beneficiaries of an estate are neces-
sarily in the same tax position. Some may have the same tax lia-
bility whether they or the estate has the stock redeemed, while the
liability of others may change depending on who has the shares
redeemed. Furthermore, there is sometimes hostility between ex-
ecutor and beneficiaries, 28 and there are undoubtedly situations
in which executor and some beneficiaries are hostile to other bene-
If the estate's 1,292 shares had been distributed equally, each beneficiary would
have received (and later redeemed) 430Y3 shares. Figures in the text are rounded
to the nearest unit.
1 2 4 See text accompanying notes 26-53 supra.
125 Each minor child would have reduced his ownership by 90%-from 21% to
4%. This reduction meets both parts of the substantially-disproportionate test-the
50% test and the 20% test. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
126 See note 22 & text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
127 The relationships are not close enough to invoke any constructive-ownership
rule. See generally text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. Also note that stock
which has been attributed from beneficiary to estate is not reattributed to another
beneficiary. I.R.C. § 318(a) (5) (C); see text accompanying notes 162-66 infra.
128 E.g., Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
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ficiaries. 129  Thus, it is not always realistic to presume an identity
of interest between the beneficiaries as a class and the estate.'
3 0
When there is no common economic interest between estate and
beneficiary, the rationale for constructive ownership is similarly
absent, and there is no motive for tax avoidance. The beneficiary-
to-estate attribution rules are thus currently applied even when
their rationale is absent, thereby unnecessarily and unfairly depriv-
ing some beneficiaries of favorable tax treatment.
This problem could be solved by separating each beneficiary's
interest in the estate and treating those interests individually. For
the purpose of analyzing stock redemptions, each estate should there-
fore be divided into as many sub-estates as there are beneficiaries. 31
Each sub-estate would be deemed actually to own stock to which
its beneficiary would be entitled. Furthermore, a sub-estate would
be deemed to own all the stock owned, constructively and actually,
by its beneficiary. The effect of the redemption would then be
considered separately for each sub-estate. The section 302(b) rules
would be used as guidelines to see if the redemption sufficiently
reduced the sub-estate's ownership such that the redemption should
be treated as a sale: some sub-estates might meet the complete-
termination test; others might achieve substantially disproportionate
reductions in ownership; some might find relief under the not-
equivalent-to-a-dividend test; and, of course, some would be taxed
at ordinary rates as dividends.
This solution can be illustrated by application to the facts of
Rickey v. United States. 3 2 Each sub-estate there would actually
own one-third of the estate's stock, or 431 shares. 33 Junior's sub-
129 The problem of breach of fiduciary responsibilities is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
130 Reply Brief for Appellant at 9, Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1979).
131 No sub-estate need be created for a beneficiary with only a remote or con-
tingent interest.
The beneficiary need not be a natural person. For instance, if a beneficiary
of an estate is a trust, the trust is considered a beneficiary for the purpose of
dividing the estate into sub-estates, while the cestui que trust need not be considered
a beneficiary. The constructive-ownership rules would still apply between the trust
and the cestui. Thus, stock owned by the cestui would be attributed to the trust
and then to the sub-estate. A trust generally has a longer life than an estate and
is effectively an entity separate from its beneficiaries, whereas an estate, because of
its short life, should not be viewed for tax purposes as an entity distinct from its
beneficiaries. Stock owned by an estate would quickly pass to the beneficiaries so
that a beneficiary can be thought of as the owner of the stock shortly after the
decedent's death. Partnerships and corporations would be treated similarly to trusts.
132 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
133 See note 121 supra.
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estate would constructively own his 708 shares, while each minor
child's sub-estate would constructively own the child's 40 shares:13 4
SUB-ESTATE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK
Before After
Redemption Redemption
Shares % Shares %
Junior's
Actual 481 19% 0 0%
Constructive 708 31% 708 74%
Total 1139 50% 708 74%
Minor Child's
Actual 431 19% 0 0%
Constructive 40 2% 40 4%
Total 471 21% 40 4%
This sub-estate division would achieve the same tax effects as if
the stock had been distributed and then redeemed: the minor chil-
dren's sub-estates would have substantially disproportionate reduc-
tions, while Junior's sub-estate would be deemed to have received
a dividend and be taxed at ordinary rates.
135
This result is proper. Junior, who has a continuing ownership
interest in the corporation, would be prevented from avoiding tax
by having stock redeemed through the estate, and the minor chil-
dren, who actually have suffered a significant reduction in owner-
ship and who have no tax-avoidance motive, would get favorable
tax treatment.
Another example may be constructed from the facts of Estate
of Webber v. United States.13 6 In Webber, father and son each
owned half of the outstanding stock of the corporation. The father
died and, under the terms of his will, his son was entitled to receive
real property and cash, while his three daughters were entitled to
the remainder of the estate. The father's stock was redeemed from
his estate pursuant to an agreement between him and his son, and
the proceeds were placed in a trust for the daughters. Under the
proposed analysis, separate sub-estates would be created for the son
and daughters. The son's sub-estate would not be deemed to own
134 Compare this table with that in text following note 124 supra.
135 See notes 123-25 supra & accompanying text.
136404 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1968).
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any stock, because it was not entitled to the proceeds of the re-
demption.137 All the estate's stock would be deemed to be owned
by the daughters' sub-estates, which would have met the complete-
termination test when the stock was redeemed. Thus, the redemp-
tion would be taxed as a sale because the beneficiaries entitled to
the proceeds of the redemption would own no stock attributed to
their sub-estate.
This sub-estate approach is more equitable for taxpayers while,
at the same time, it furthers the theoretical goals. Beneficiaries
would be taxed according to their different economic interests and
tax situations. Tax avoidance would still be prevented through
the constructive-ownership rules, and taxpayers would be able to
determine in advance the tax consequences of a redemption.
Further, the analysis may be mechanically applied. Indeed, the
only change from current practice is that beneficiaries would be
taxed in accordance with their own corporate ownership instead of
that of an unrelated party.
B. Implementation
Although this proposal for partial waiver of the attribution
rules gives the result most desirable in theory, it does not at first
blush fit into the current statutory scheme. Attribution cannot
be disregarded for the safe-harbor rules of sections 302 (b) (2) and
(3)-the substantially-disproportionate and complete-termination
tests-for the same reasons that the Rickey court should not have
allowed waiver.138 These provisions are unambiguous, rigid tests
demanding mechanical readings.
Courts may, however, offer relief through the section 302 (b) (1)
not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test. Although attribution in general
fully applies to section 302 (b) (1),139 partial attribution is nonethe-
less appropriate because of the vague, flexible nature of the test.
140
In fact, courts have used it to ignore attribution altogether.141
Finally, the notion of sub-estates coincides with, and plugs a loop-
hole in, recent changes in the Code.
142
137 See text following note 131 supra. If the son were paid with proceeds from
the redemption of the stock, his sub-estate would be deemed to own those shares.
Id.
138 See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
139 See text accompanying notes 45-53 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 143-46 infra.
141 See text accompanying notes 147-61 infra.
142 See text accompanying notes 162-66 infra.
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Congress retained the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test in the
1954 Code to provide the courts with flexibility; 143 thus, the
court's "inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether
or not the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized
as a sale of stock." 144 A sale is evidenced by reduction of owner-
ship interests 145 "depend[ing] on the facts and circumstances of
each case," and attribution is only "[o]ne of the facts to be con-
sidered." 146
Accordingly, courts have used section 302 (b) (1) to allow
capital-gain treatment despite the attribution rules. For instance,
in Estate of Arthur H. Squier,147 an estate reduced its corporate
ownership from over 50% to 41%.148 Without attribution, the re-
demption would not have been equivalent to a dividend because
of the estate's significant loss of control. 149 After the redemption,
however, a beneficiary owned 11% of the stock,150 so that the
estate's post-redemption ownership, with beneficiary-to-estate attri-
bution, was 52%, not enough to bring about a loss in control.
Because of a "sharp cleavage" 151 between executor and beneficiary,
the court focused only on the estate's actual ownership, holding that
the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend under
section 302 (b) (1).152
The court in Haft Trust v. Commissioner 153 also found that
attribution was not controlling for section 302 (b) (1) redemptions.
Here, trusts for the Haft children had all of their corporate stock
redeemed. After application of constructive ownership, however,
the trusts' total ownership increased from 31%% to 33%% because
of attribution from father to children and then to the trusts.154
The parents had recently undergone an acrimonious divorce, and
the children lived with their mother; after the divorce proceedings
143 See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
144 S. REP., supra note 80, at 233-34, [1954] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at
4870-71.
145 See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
146 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).




151 Id. 955. The cleavage is described in id. 951.
152 Id. 955-56.
153 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
154 Id. 46 & n.2.
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were initiated, the father saw the children only infrequently,15 and
his support payments were, at best, irregular. 56 The First Circuit
remanded the case for a determination of whether the evidence of
family hostility negated "the presumption that taxpayers would
exert continuing control over the corporation despite the redemp-
tion." 157 The court relied on the decision in Squier. 58 as well as
IRS regulations 159 and legislative history, 60 concluding that
though a wooden subjugation to the attribution rules
might have administrative advantages it could also work
injustice in particular cases, and we think that in retaining
this section [(302(b)(1))] in the Code alongside the safe
harbor rules, Congress showed itself willing to tolerate
some administrative inconvenience for the sake of tax-
payer equity.161
Thus, courts applying the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test have
disregarded the attribution rules when there was evidence rebutting
the underlying presumption of economic unity and taxpayers would
otherwise be treated inequitably.
In addition, Congress has shown its willingness to eliminate
inequitable attribution. Prior to the enactment of section 318
(a) (5) in 1964,162 stock owned by one beneficiary was partially re-
attributed to other beneficiaries through the estate. 63 For instance,
in Rickey, all of Junior's stock would have been attributed to the
estate, and then one-third of that stock would have been reat-
tributed to each of the minor children. Under this "sidewise at-
tribution," as long as the estate existed the minor children could
not have satisfied the complete-termination test even by terminating
their actual interests.




158 Id. 46-47. The court said that its prior decision in Bradbury v. Commis-
sioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962), endorsed the Squier "principle that family
discord could belie the community-of-interest rationale and was thus a relevant
circumstance in determining dividend equivalency under 302(b)(1)." 510 F.2d
at 46.
-59Id. 47; see Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955); text accompanying note 146
supra.
160 510 F.2d at 48; see text accompanying notes 76-86 supra.
161 510 F.2d at 48.
162 Section 318(a)(5) was added by Pub. L. No. 88-554, § 4 (a), 78 Stat. 761
(1964). The relevant portion of § 318(a)(5) is reproduced in-note 25 supra.
163 See generally, e.g., Loeb, supra note 5, at 431-32; Binge], Surrey & Warren,
supra note 5, at 220-21.
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Congress eliminated this sidewise attribution, recognizing that
"there is no basis either in family relationship or in common eco-
nomic interest for the application of these two attribution rules at
the same time." 1" Thus today, the minor children could com-
pletely terminate their interests if the estate's stock were distributed
to them and all their stock then redeemed; 165 their taxation would
not depend on the holdings of Junior, who would be an unrelated
stockholder under the terms of the Code.166
Similarly, taxation of their interest in the estate should not
depend on Junior's holdings. Although the estate is technically the
redeemed shareholder, it is economically more realistic to impose
tax consequences as if the beneficiaries were the redeemed share-
holders because the estate is generally a short-lived entity and the
tax is eventually paid by the beneficiaries. Courts can achieve this
treatment through the not-equivalent-to-a-dividend test of section
302 (b) (1). The analysis proposed by this Comment suggests that
that tax treatment should depend on the relationship of the indi-
vidual beneficiary to the estate, and that this procedure fully com-
ports with Congress's intent in retaining section 302 (b) (1) and
eliminating sidewise attribution. The alternatives are inequitable
treatment for minor shareholders, or, as in Rickey, a loss to the
treasury because of an undeserved windfall to majority shareholders.
If the courts do not act to resolve the problem, Congress should
eliminate the incongruity in the Code by adopting this Comment's
proposal.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit, in Rickey v. United States,167 held that an
estate may waive the entity-attribution rules when stock that it
holds is redeemed by the corporation. The court neither fully nor
satisfactorily explained its reasoning. It allowed the taxpayer sale
treatment under the complete-termination test of section 302 (b) (3),
although it recognized that its holding was inconsistent with a literal
reading of that section. The decision was based on what the court
said was an unintended inequity in the Code. A discussion of the
legislative history and the theory of the attribution rules and stock-
redemption tests, however, reveals that the result which the court
164S. REP. No. 1240, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3396, 3402.
165 Cf. text accompanying notes 123-25 supra (if minor children redeemed only
distributed shares, they would today qualify for substantially-disproportionate
redemption).
166 Cf. id. (Junior gets dividend treatment because he retains control).
167 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
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labored to avoid was indeed intended by Congress and accords with
tax policy and theory. The analysis also highlights an inequity
which the Fifth Circuit failed to note-one beneficiary's inheritance
may unfairly suffer because of an unrelated beneficiary's stock hold-
ings.
The proper tax treatment of corporate redemptions by estates
is to attribute a beneficiary's holdings only to his own portion of the
estate. Courts can implement this treatment within the frame-
work and policy of the section 302(b)(1) not-equivalent-to-a-divi-
dend test without flouting the current statutory and administrative
scheme. The result will be increased judicial flexibility and greater
guidance and equity for taxpayers.
